Traffic, hoodies, and the Kabaka: limits to inclusive urban planning in Kampala by Andrea M. Brown

There is a lot of traffic congestion in Kampala, and ambitious plans to sort it out. This is not unusual for rapidly urbanizing cities in Africa, but in Kampala geography, politics, and land ownership complicate things. Geography makes road infrastructure and managing pollution difficult because the city is built on seven hills. A straightforward road grid is impossible. Further, Kampala is one of the most polluted cities in the world, in part because exhaust fumes collect in the valleys of the city while vehicles idle in gridlocked traffic. Uganda is one of the fastest urbanizing nations in Africa; the urban population of 1.5 million in 2013 is projected to exceed 20 million by 2040 (World Bank). Current infrastructure – and not just road infrastructure – lags far behind the needs of its steadily expanding population.

New Vision image Kampala traffic

Source: New Vision

Last week when I was in Kampala, the 3km journey from the central business district to the upscale residential area of Kololo took an hour in a taxi during rush hour. The Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) has prioritized road upgrades, widening major thoroughfares, redesigning junctions, and repairing potholes with six major projects underway or completed over the past five years. The World Bank, who is loaning Uganda US$ 212 million for infrastructural development, is supporting this. Roadwork is the main spending area for Uganda’s urban infrastructure investments.

Gridlocked traffic not only results from congestion, but also from poverty. And politics. And better roads won’t solve these bigger issues. Road congestion is markedly worsened by the boda boda (motor bike) taxi system that most low income Ugandans rely upon to get around. Informal venders are also a contributing factor. The informal retail market employs over 90 percent of young workers (77% of Ugandans are under the age of 30) and some venders walk through traffic or may block roadways as well as sidewalks.

The KCCA has legislated a restrictive regulatory environment to improve safety, register, and regulate boda drivers, and to remove retailers from operating along side roads and among traffic, in order to limit the negative impacts for commuters. However, many of these interventions have been overruled by President Museveni, for whom both boda drivers and street venders are important constituencies. He has stated that his weak showing in the last elections was in part because of disgruntled boda drivers, and he is trying to court their favour in the face of Uganda-wide declining political legitimacy.

This summer President Museveni is threatening once again to toughen up regulations, for security reasons. An MP and his brother were gunned down outside his home by two hooded men on a motorcycle in June, not the first such case in Uganda. In response, the President has said hoodies will be banned on boda bodas and re-asserted the need for all drivers to wear helmets with a clear registration number on them. The response from Boda drivers and informal clothing venders (fearing a drop in hoodie sales) has been swift though, and few believe this ban will be enforced, but instead will go the way of the ban on plastic bags which has been weakly implemented. Politically, threatening the livelihoods of low income urban traders and boda drivers is unwise, and the current practice of threats followed by concessions is likely to continue.

Kampala’s seven hills have also led to an unusual pattern of urban settlement. In most large African cities, a few informal settlements, or slums, have formed over time, swelling with urbanization and typically on the outskirts of town. In Kampala there are 60 distinct slums, spread throughout the city. They are in the low-lying areas, which are flood-prone and, until recently, difficult to develop. Geography has influenced this, but so to have the politics of land ownership. Kampala operates with five separate land systems: there is government land, private land, church/mosque owned land, and two types of mailo, or royal land, the Kabaka’s (King of Buganda’s) land and private mailo. All of the slums in Kampala are on mailo land.

Kabaka theugandan.com.ug

Source: The Ugandan

In 1900, the Buganda agreement between the British colonial rulers and the King of Buganda, the Kabaka, divided all land in this region of Uganda in two, with half under the control of the Kabaka, the other half the British. The mailo land, was then divided into two, with half going to office holders from the kingdom, others to private individuals. Mailo land cannot be transferred, it is hereditary and based on royal position.  After independence from Britain, only colonial held land was transferred to the Ugandan state. This offers both protection to slum residents – the government of Uganda cannot easily displace them – but also obstacles for urban planning as any kind of development, whether a shopping mall, a railway, or slum upgrading – must be negotiated with the Kabaka, who has no official power but significant urban and traditional support and, of course, the power associated with considerable land wealth. Whether the Kabaka can genuinely be seen as a protector of the urban poor is open to debate, but he is an interesting limit on an increasingly centralized government.

 

World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/03/03/managing-rapid-urbanization-can-help-uganda-achieve-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth

Andrea M. Brown, Associate Professor of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University and Associate Director of the Tshepo Institute for the Study of Contemporary Africa. abrown@wlu.ca

 

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Abdul Raufa Mustapha and Progressive Scholarship by Jeff Grischow

A colleague recently sent me a link to a 2014 interview with Dr. Abdul Raufa Mustapha.  A renowned Nigerian scholar, Dr. Mustapha passed away from cancer on 8 August 2017 after a distinguished academic career at Amadu Bello University (ABU) and the University of Oxford. He is remembered as a first-rate scholar and a committed activist whose work gave voice to marginalized people and communities in Africa.  Raufu (as he was known to students and colleagues) was born in Aba in eastern Nigeria but he was fluent in the country’s three major languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yorubu), and his work on Nigeria attempted to bring together the divided populations of the north and south.  Raufu studied at the Federal College in Sokoto and then took an MA and MSc in Political Science at  ABU (1974-9), where he taught until moving to Oxford in 1996.

mustapha

At Oxford, Raufu was tutored and mentored by Gavin Williams of St. Peter’s College.  Williams taught at St. Peter’s from 1975 to 2010.  Williams’ work on peasants and rural development in Africa, including Nigeria, has been extremely influential among Africanists since the 1970s.  In Williams, Raufu found an ideal mentor and colleague.

After completing a Masters and DPhil at St. Peter’s, Raufu taught Politics in Oxford’s Department of International Development from 1996 until his death last August.  His research focused on African democratization as well as the politics of identity and ethnicity.  Raufu’s scholarship sought to bring rigorous scientific analysis to issues of social change, providing a foundation for combatting marginalization and improving the lives of ordinary people.  But he came from a generation of progressive, radical scholars who also acknowledged the dangers of identity politics and its threat to democratic societies.  In this context, Raufu published on the question of identity politics and Nigerian democracy, and, perhaps more importantly, his later work included two edited books on Boko Haram and religious identities in Northern Nigeria.  His work on identity politics will perhaps be Raufu’s most lasting legacy.  In the words of a tribute by Jibrin Ibrahim in the Review of African Political Economy:

Raufu’s burning desire over the past few years was the imperative of understanding      the insurgency so that we could begin the difficult process of addressing the core issues of poverty, inequality and the crumbling social order, all of which have wreaked havoc on Nigerian society and are dismantling the nation. Ultimately, his concern was the construction of a peaceful united country with a progressive social system that would address the needs of all its citizens. His numerous, relations, friends and comrades will continue to miss Raufu.

At a time when the progressive left is being increasingly under vilified in North American universities (including Canadian institutions), we would do well to remember Raufu’s towering intellect, his focus on shining a light on social marginalization, and his humane, progressive commitment to democracy in Africa.  His work should be widely read, now more than ever.

Selected Publications:

Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War, McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Abdul Raufu Mustapha (ed), Turning Points in African Democracy, Oxford University Press, 2009.

Abdul Raufu Mustapha (ed), Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria. Boydell and Brewer, 2014.

Abdul Raufu Mustapha and David Ehrhardt (eds), Creed & Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations & Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria. Boydell and Brewer, 2018.

The video mentioned above is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1Lc5vB8_bM&app=desktop

President Trump, UN Ambassador Haley and Africa by Jeff Grischow

On September 20, 2017, President Trump announced that he was sending UN Ambassador Nikki Haley and Human Services Secretary Tom Price to Africa.  Two countries were a particular concern for Trump.  At a lunch with African leaders during the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, Trump told them that the US Government was “closely monitoring and deeply disturbed by the ongoing violence in South Sudan and the (Democratic Republic of) Congo.”  The solutions according to Trump had to be ‘African-led,’ and to support this, Trump said, “I’m sending Ambassador Nikki Haley to Africa to discuss avenues of conflict and resolution, and, most importantly, prevention.”

africa_enhanced_physical_giclee-borders-labels_lg

But this is only part of Trump’s full intentions.  A month later, Haley published an Op Ed on CNN’s under the headline “This is why the President is sending me to Africa.”  Haley laid out three American interests in Africa: humanitarian, economic and strategic.  Haley focused on the first, which Trump alluded to above.  But rather than setting out a blueprint for US assistance, Haley proffered a threat to African leaders – and (maybe more importantly) a reassurance to the American public: unless African politicians cleaned up their act, Trump will withdraw American support for UN humanitarian missions in South Sudan and the DRC.  Underlying this threat is the American assumption that the crises in South Sudan and the DRC are entirely due to a lack of political will on the part of African political leaders.  In South Sudan, the hope of independence on July 9, 2011, was shattered within two years as civil conflict upended any chances of a smooth and peaceful transition to independence.  Meanwhile, Haley said, the DRC has been in chaos since the 1990s and there is little hope of solving the crisis.  The end result has been a steady flow of refugees out of both countries, creating a huge problem and potentially threatening to bring “dangerous results.”

Haley did not explain what she meant by “dangerous results” but we’re relatively safe in assuming she is referring to security threats – probably including threats within the United States.  Given Trump’s travel bans and protectionist (and nativist) policies, could Haley’s unnamed dangers reflect American strategic interests in Africa revolving around international and domestic security?  It’s not implausible.  On the security issue, it is also interesting that the US government has ended the Temporary Protected Status for Sudanese citizens, and (after several extensions) plans to end it for South Sudanese citizens in May, 2019 (TPS allows foreign nationals to stay and work in the USA in cases of civil conflict or natural disasters in their home countries).

Haley did not address American economic interests in her Op Ed.  But Trump reportedly did, in his characteristic style, when he met with the African leaders in New York.  “Africa has tremendous business potential,” he told them, “I have so many friends going to your countries trying to get rich.”  Well, that’s honest I guess.  “I congratulate you,” he continued, “they’re spending a lot of money. But it does, it has tremendous business potential, and representing huge amounts of different markets, and for American firms it’s really become a place they have to go, that they want to go.”  Interesting.

If we put these pieces together, the Trump’s administration’s African policy appears to relate mainly to (1) domestic security in the US; (2) being able to send African refugees back home (3) providing opportunities for American capitalists to exploit the continent’s growing markets; and (4) reducing the US’s funding to the United Nations for humanitarian assistance to South Sudan and the DRC.  Putting the blame for conflict solely on the shoulders of African political elites seems like a convenient strategy for achieving these goals.

Sources:

https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/20/nikki-haley-tom-price-africa-242938

https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFW1N1D9024

https://www.voanews.com/a/donald-trump-nikki-haley-envoy-south-sudan-congo/4037234.html

http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/21/opinions/un-drc-south-sudan-nikki-haley-opinion/index.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-sudan/u-s-ends-temporary-protected-status-for-sudanese-but-extends-it-for-south-sudanese-idUSKCN1BT2RL?il=0